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Indoctrination and Assimilation in Plural Settings 
KEN BADLEY 
Atwofold problem faces Canadian education. The first fold involves the indoctrination debate, still unsettled after several decades, yet still bearing decisively on educational policy. The second fold involves the 
changing Canadian educational landscape, now obviously characterized by 
increasing cultural, religious, and linguistic plurality. This plurality manifests 
itself in tribalism and in regular conflicts about normativity in the public square. 
In the midst of this plurality, many Canadian parents of school-aged children 
believe that courts, provincial governments, and educational authorities deny 
them educational justice by determining that their own religion cannot inform 
what their children learn in schools. Yet, from their vantage point, their own 
educational tax dollars are used to indoctrinate their children into another 
worldview-some combination of materialism, secular humanism, and liberal-
ism-every day of the school year. When these parents cry foul, defenders of 
common schools reply that the only way to make schools accessible to everyone 
is to make them neutral, which implies leaving religion out of education. 
Examining the various charges and replies in this discussion reveals a 
philosophical-ideological thicket, through which the various parties apparently 
can no longer hear each other. I suggest that educators and educational theorists 
could go a long way toward solving these policy difficulties if we can find the 
will to move forward on the matters of indoctrination, pluralism, and related 
concepts, such as neutrality. 1 
INDOCTRINATION: AN UNSETTLED DEBATE 
Conceptual problems and disagreements still dog the debate about 
indoctrination in education, even after decades of struggle. Educators, 
philosophers of education, the courts, and the public, dispute what differentiates 
indoctrination from education, and what criterion or combination of criteria 
actually singles out what counts as indoctrination. What does count as 
indoctrination? The criteria usually listed include: 
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• the intention of the teaching activity is to bring about in the student 
unshakable or unquestioning belief in an idea, regardless of the veracity of 
that idea.2 
• the means of teaching violate in one or more ways the rights, agency, or 
person of the student. In the language of the philosophy of education, the 
means violate a differentiated or positive concept of education, in which 
worthwhile learning is implied versus education in the descriptive or 
undifferentiated (education system) sense of the word. 3 On this account, 
education implies approval of the means of teaching by whomever is 
speaking at the moment. 
• the contents are doctrinaire or contain doctrinaire elements. Some claim 
simply that if the contents are about doctrines then we have a case of 
indoctrination.4 In Holocaust revisionism, we uncover a paradigm case of 
doctrinaire contents. Some observers, of course, suggest that instruction 
in Christian faith serves equally well as a paradigm. 
• the upshot or outcomes of teaching involves the student's emerging with 
either false, unquestioning, or unshakeable beliefs, despite a teacher's good 
intentions, laudable methods, and worthwhile content.5 
Each of the above has found defenders who have argued that one of these 
criteria is sufficient by itself to identify indoctrination; others have argued for 
various combinations of the four. Debates continue regarding each of the 
separate criteria as well, resulting in questions like: what is a worthwhile 
intention, what are acceptable means, what are doctrinaire contents, and what 
is false belief, unshakable belief, and non-evidential belief? Some, in their 
innocence perhaps, have even asked what is wrong with unshakeable beliefs, 
especially and obviously, for example, with regard to analytic truths such as 2 
+2=4. 
Aside from the disagreement about means, intentions, content, and 
outcomes, other matters remain: 
1. Distinguishing and delimiting such key concepts germane to the 
indoctrination discussion as neutral, fairminded, impartial, empathetic, 
committed, dispassionate, and just; 
2. Establishing the semantic range and possibly the logical status of doctrines; 
and 
3. Establishing whether religion has been defined too narrowly, and whether 
worldviews might not lead to clearer reflection on indoctrination.6 
By no means, do these questions exhaust the avenues of approach we might 
take to such a complex area of enquiry. To the point of this chapter, the debate 
on indoctrination has thus far largely failed to identify the following: 
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1. Cases where a community or society widely accepts a dominant worldview 
and then hegemonically enforces that view through the school system. This 
situation is illustrated for us if we believe, for example, the allegations 
typically made on the one side by critical theorists (who believe schools 
have been hijacked by free-market conservatives), and, on the other side, 
by conservative observers (who believe schools have been hijacked by 
leftists and liberals); and 
2. Cases where the curriculum contents fail to treat a matter sufficiently and 
thus portray, by silence, an inaccurate picture, regardless of the intentions 
(or means) of this lopsided portrayal. For example, Aboriginal Canadians 
are usually invisible in histories of Canadian engagement in World War II. 
The role of religion often goes missing in Canadian curricula. Until recent 
years, women and "ordinary life" were largely absent from most history 
books. I will return shortly-in my discussion of pluralism-to these 
sometimes overlapping, unidentified, possible cases of indoctrination. 
Several participants in the indoctrination debate have noted how frequently 
one person positively labels a process education which someone else insists 
counts as indoctrination. 7 Noting this tendency certainly does not gut the latter 
term of its meaning for other purposes, but it should give anyone pause before 
levelling the criticism that someone else is indoctrinating. That the pejorative 
sense of indoctrination has now largely supplanted the descriptive, instructional 
sense of the term (dating from before World War II) may or may not be related 
to education's being largely a positive term, whose differentiated sense implies 
worthwhile learning done in acceptable ways. 8 Whatever the range of possible 
relationships between the two concepts, indoctrination and education, they 
become diametric terms only when one selects the negative meaning of the one 
and the positive sense of the other. 
PLURALITY AND PLURALISM: FORCING A RECONSIDERATION 
Plurality and Pluralism 
To begin this section, I will differentiate pluralism and plurality. In common 
Canadian usage, pluralism tends to do two jobs which we should not only 
distinguish, but which we ought to assign to two separate words if we hope to 
maintain precision through our discussions, and eventually move those 
discussions forward. First, pluralism usually designates a plural situation, to 
which I would rather assign the term plurality. In this situation of plurality, we 
find more-than-oneness, the "coexistence within one political jurisdiction of 
people with publicly important different beliefs and ways of life," people with 
"incommensurate ideological" differences, who "indwell irreducibly different 
worlds."9 The term commonly used for both meanings, pluralism, also implies 
the absolutization or advocacy of the plural situation. That is: as an "ism" it 
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implies that the many-ness designated by the rarely used term plurality (and by 
the frequently used term pluralism) is worthwhile and that public policy should 
be directed toward its realization. Confusion attends the use of pluralism 
because it usually does this double duty, describing a plural state of affairs and 
prescribing partiality to that state of affairs. I want to restrict pluralism to the 
second, prescriptive meaning listed because, while I take it as given that Canada 
faces cultural, linguistic, and religious plurality, it is not so clear how many 
Canadians actually value genuine pluralism, or which kinds of plurality they 
wish to embrace. 10 
Thus, although I noted the typical implications of "ism" words a moment 
ago, my desire to restrict pluralism does not rest on morphological grounds. 
Still, in differentiating these two senses of pluralism, and assigning one to the 
separate term plurality, I think I am making morphological sense. 
In graphing the range of possible responses to plurality, we may see more 
easily the importance of distinguishing these two common meanings of 
pluralism, and thus the value of assigning one of the meanings its own more 
descriptive word, plurality. Faced with linguistic, religious, or ethnic plurality, 
a society, its institutions, and individuals might respond in any of several ways: 
celebration tolerance eradication 
respect assimilation 
Obviously, other words could be used instead of these five, and other 
intermediate points on the continuum could be identified. My suggestion here 
is that ordinary usage has varied from what one might expect. Words ending 
in "ism" usually connote a position of advocacy. Yet, recognizably, eradication 
and assimilation can hardly be viewed as the advocacy of plurality. Even 
tolerance leaves us in some doubt, despite its having become a kind oflinguistic 
icon in multicultural, Canadian education. In light of the amount of fuzzy usage 
in usual discussions in these areas, I recommend to all of us the distinctive 
terms pluralism and plurality, and will use them as distinctive terms throughout 
this chapter. 
History of Canadian Plurality 
One comment on the prehistory of Canadian plurality is warranted. Religious 
wars made it clear to post-Reformation Europe and England that some common 
basis for public peace was required. The 1689 Act of Toleration in England 
was viewed by many as a legislative means to end publicly oppressive and 
tyrannical expressions of religious intolerance. Perceptions have shifted over 
three centuries so that by our own time, pluralism (in its undifferentiated sense) 
has achieved the status of secular doctrine, almost of cultural myth. Canadian 
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plurality has, until recently, seemed to rest on three related, classical liberal, 
largely unchallenged, somewhat contradictory assumptions: 
1. That we can get along only when we leave our deepest (religious) 
commitments in the private sphere; 
2. That the public square must be reserved only for those things which we all 
hold in common (despite the now-so-typically Canadian use of public 
money to celebrate some fundamental differences); and 
3. That the public school must and can be neutral. 
New conditions in both Canada and the rest of the world are beginning to 
force all educators to consider again our understandings of both plurality and 
indoctrination. A "crisis of nationalism" 11 begins to tear Europe apart almost 
as soon as the Soviet empire dissolves. Religious violence threatens the 
stability of many nations. And, to the substance of this section of this chapter, 
people around the world ask why there is no space for their religious 
convictions in publicly funded schools that, they charge, are not neutral but 
rather thoroughly doctrinaire. In Canada, several changes now force us to 
reappraise plurality (and indoctrination). Immigration has brought increasing 
cultural, linguistic, and religious plurality to Canada. As it does elsewhere, 
disagreement frequently erupts in Canada regarding what topics are too divisive 
(language, religion, culture) or controversial (abortion, homosexuality, birth 
control) for treatment in Canadian schools. 12 The Council of Ministers of 
Education of Canada (CMEC) has recognized Canadian plurality and, in a 1992 
memorandum of agreement, seemed to lean toward the acceptance/celebration 
end of the continuum: 
Canada is a highly diversified country in every respect. Linguistic, racial, 
cultural and religious differences, within and among provinces and 
territories, are a fundamental characteristic of its people. We view this 
pluralism as a source of great richness for the country, and believe that its 
strength lies in maintaining a profound respect for differences. 13 
Despite their undifferentiated use of pluralism, the ministers express a common 
Canadian sentiment. Interestingly, they include religion on their list. 
Multiculturalism, until now, has primarily been perceived as a cultural and 
linguistic matter. 14 The Canadian education ministers thus offer a more 
inclusive range of characteristics by including religion in their statement. With 
or without religion, their list points toward the respect and celebration end of 
the continuum that I sketched earlier. Whether Canada is pluralistic is another 
matter. Many Canadians point to a gulf between prose such as that in the 
CMEC agreement and the reality they witness in their own schools, where, they 
insist, some important differences between Canadians are barely tolerated, let 
alone accepted or celebrated. 
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Two other factors add to the difficulty that schools and policy-makers 
encounter in their work. First-a foreground factor-the public has 
historically come to view schools as a natural channel to bring about social 
change. This view has meant increasing, not decreasing, normativity in the 
curriculum regarding such matters as the environment, AIDS, smoking, and 
nutrition. Ironically, this increase in normativity comes at a time when, in the 
hands of schools, religious allegiances have become mere preferences, and 
individualism seems to have taken ethics by storm. The second is a background 
factor: previously central groups, such as the church, which did indoctrinate or 
try to assimilate and even eradicate difference, now find themselves 
marginalized. Here, I choose the church as an example, and the words central 
and marginalized specifically to echo R. I. Moore's 1990 book, The Formation 
of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250. 
Another example of this emigration from centre to margin relates to what is 
now roughly called "Euro-centrism" in the curriculum, a view of the world now 
frequently questioned by educators and others concerned with education. 
What has changed to warrant my proposing that the advent of cultural and 
religious plurality suggests that the unsettled indoctrination debate be examined 
again? Little has changed within the debate itself. Rather, the social and 
educational landscape in Canada, like that of Britain and the United States, has 
undergone statistically small but politically significant alteration so that 
Canadian schools now serve several constituencies in ways that the members 
of those constituencies consider inadequate. Specifically, the epistemological 
assumptions underlying Western thought and science are seen to be in conflict 
with certain peoples' religious convictions and ways of life. 
Muslims 
The Canadian Muslim population remains small, but Muslims encounter great 
difficulty in accepting the claim to objectivity which underlies Western 
science. 15 I will quote representative sources to illustrate this difficulty: 
In Islam and the civilization which it created there was a veritable 
celebration of knowledge all ... related to the sacred extending in a hierarchy 
from an "empirical" and rational mode of knowing to that highest form of 
knowledge (al-macrifah or cirfan) which is the unitive knowledge of God 
not by [people] as [individuals], but by the divine center of human 
intelligence which, at the level of gnosis, becomes the subject as well as 
object of knowledge. 16 
Many in the West consider this isolation of object from subject one of the 
prerequisites of knowing; knowing is viewed as an asymmetrical relation 
between subject and object. In fact, those who celebrate what they see as the 
superiority of Western science and philosophy, often point to this feature as that 
which, perhaps more than any other, has served to move Western science ahead. 
1ty 
:rs 
as 
ial 
he 
1d 
he 
1d 
1d 
or 
es 
al 
m 
0. 
is 
w 
1d 
!d 
1d 
as 
at 
rs 
al 
ct 
at 
n 
1e 
n 
1e 
lt 
i. 
Indoctrination and Assimilation 57 
But some cry "foul" regarding the claim that Wes tern thought and science are 
neutral, objective and therefore superior. To these people, Western arrogance 
flows out of Wes tern mis perception of the subject/object relationship that 
informs the hegemonic Western view of knowledge. 
Qadir puts the problem more starkly than does Nasr: 
[T]he Islamic theory of knowledge .. .is fundamentally different from the 
Western theory. One major reason for the difference is that the former is 
based upon the spiritual conception of[human beings] and the universe [they 
inhabit], while the latter is secular and devoid of the sense of the Sacred. It 
is precisely for this reason, according to Muslim thinkers, that the Western 
theory of knowledge poses one of the greatest challenges to [hu]mankind. 
Knowledge in the West has become problematic as it has lost its true 
purpose. It is ill-conceived and wrongly interpreted. It has elevated doubt 
and scepticism and in some cases agnosticism to the level of scientific 
methodology and has thereby brought chaos to all realms of human 
knowledge. However, it should be understood that the Western conception 
of knowledge is not value-free as is sometimes supposed; it is very much 
partial, being the product of the Western worldview. 17 
Many in the West would object that Qadir' s complaints are ill-founded, that our 
science is value-free, and that it yields up objective knowledge. Yet, if Qadir 
is correct in delineating the differences between Islamic and Western views of 
knowledge, he makes quite plain why some people believe that allegedly 
neutral, publicly funded schools indoctrinate. 
Now, some may object by arguing that Muslims have their epistemology 
wrong. But for the question of indoctrination as I mean us to reconsider it here, 
such an objection carries little weight. Two groups follow incompatible episte-
mologies, both claiming to be able to adjudge the other. In a sense, the 
philosophical discussion must stand aside because we live in plural Canada. 
Why? Because Muslims use the school system, and they are not interested in 
being told they simply have understood epistemology wrongly. The point is 
that from their point of view, Wes tern education appears fundamentally in 
opposition to their at-bottom convictions about the world and their knowledge 
of it. 18 Qadir continues his remarks this way: 
[T]he sense of the Sacred which furnishes the ultimate ground for 
knowledge has to accompany and to interpenetrate the educative process at 
every stage. Allah not only stands at the beginning of knowledge, He also 
stands at the end, and He also accompanies and infuses grace into the entire 
process of learning. In this process the sense of the Sacred is nowhere lost 
sight of. 19 
I will quote just one more remark from Qadir to illustrate how deeply Muslims' 
difficulty with Canadian education might run: "The distinction between divine 
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and non-divine knowledge is spurious. Knowledge is knowledge ... no matter 
what its contents are."20 
Given this epistemology, Muslims will not be satisfied to have a world 
religions class added into the curriculum somewhere in grades ten to twelve. 
Nor will recognition of the Islamic year satisfy them. Muslims would view 
these moves and others like them as unsatisfactory carrots, as insults. Religion 
is, in one sense, everything for them, and as the Islamic Institute at Cambridge 
argues continually, they believe school curriculum should reflect this. In 
Ontario, a few Muslim families have sent their children to Christian schools, a 
phenomenon already widespread in England. The parents of the Muslim 
children in these Christian schools reason that although Christianity may be an 
inferior religion, Christian schools at least recognize the hand of God on all of 
life. They prefer this combination to publicly funded education, which insists 
that the public square cannot make space for genuine religious differences and 
that, when religion does come to school, it must be reduced to a song-and-dance 
routine. The restoration of Christian religious education in British 
(state-funded) common schools in 1988 was, in fact, heavily supported by 
Muslims, who argued that religion belonged in schools. Furthermore, they 
argued that because Christianity-even if only nominal Christianity-was the 
majority religion in Britain, Christianity, rather than comparative religions, 
should be taught in British schools. That some Muslims in Britain still send 
their children to Christian schools illustrates the depth of their conviction that 
religious faith underlies the whole of the educational endeavour. 
Canadian Aboriginal Peoples 
For those from parts of Canada with minute Muslim populations, traditional 
Canadian Aboriginal epistemology may pose more of a challenge.21 Like 
Muslims, Canadian Aboriginals protest the Western approach to knowledge that 
underlies and saturates Canadian school curricula. For them, an obvious point 
of difference with the dominant approach lies in the view of the natural world, 
of which they consider human life an integral, not a separate part.22 Again, 
Western science and philosophy assume that subject-separateness is a strength, 
and even a necessary first step to the development of our science. Such a view 
is antithetical to the panentheism of Aboriginal spirituality. This short extract 
from the Thanksgiving Prayer of the Longhouse People catches some flavour 
of the Aboriginal view of the interrelatedness of all things: 
We have been given the duty 
To live in harmony with one another 
And with other living things. 
We give thanks that this is true. 
We give thanks to our Mother Earth. 
All that makes us strong and alive, comes from you 
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We are all like children as we walk upon you. 
You nourish us and all living things. 
59 
Defenders of Western thought might (accurately) protest that the panentheism 
evident here would not move Western science ahead, or even that Canadian 
Aboriginal children had best learn Western ways if they want to get ahead in 
Canadian life. Economically, such assimilationist sentiments make sense.23 
But to express them is, in a sense, to be answering the wrong question, because 
Aboriginal people are concerned about a worldview inimical to their own. They 
argue that this worldview runs through the curriculum and that publicly funded 
Canadian schools (even band-controlled ones) indoctrinate. Mentioning 
Aboriginal history, or even worldviews, in a class here and there does not 
address the underlying differences between Western epistemology and an 
epistemology informed by traditional Aboriginal spirituality, nor does it address 
the problems Canadian Aboriginals thereby typically encounter in Canadian 
curricula. 
A brief survey of Canadian curricula which give space to Aboriginal 
epistemology is very brief indeed. At this time, Newfoundland recognizes it 
only minimally.24 In the Nova Scotia social studies curriculum, the Mi'kmaq 
people are studied, though not in detail.25 New Brunswick offers a grade eleven 
and twelve native studies course, and two elementary schools offer Maliseet 
heritage programs.26 Prince Edward Island gives 25 percent of its grade seven 
social studies curriculum to Aboriginal cultures.27 In Manitoba, Aboriginal 
epistemology and spirituality are included throughout kindergarten to grade 
twelve social studies in the context of broader examination of Aboriginal 
culture, recognizing "that in traditional societies spirituality informs the day to 
day activities of the people, and that a knowledge of people's beliefs and values 
is essential to understanding the society."28 According to the 1989 Indian and 
Metis education policy from kindergarten to grade twelve, the province of 
Saskatchewan requires that Aboriginal content-that is, epistemology and 
spirituality-be integrated into all curriculum areas. By the 1992-93 school 
year, Aboriginal content was being classroom tested. To their credit, officials 
in Saskatchewan education understood that Aboriginal spirituality was not 
simply a compartment oflife: "When people see the term spirituality, they often 
assume it is a form of religion. It is not. Rather, Indigenous spirituality is a 
philosophy which attempts to understand human existence and relationships 
with nature. It is a perspective of individual and community development, 
human societies and the environment."29 In Alberta, all students take 
Aboriginal "histories, cultures, and lifestyles" in various social studies courses 
"so they can benefit from the values and lifestyles of Native cultures."30 The 
Native Education Project produced a Native Content Analysis Information 
guide in September 1989 to aid in detecting bias. While it raises several 
concerns, it deals little with the integrality of Aboriginal worldviews. In British 
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Columbia, nothing specific is required, and even in band-controlled schools, 
attention is varied, "depending on the convictions of the band."31 
As one might expect, the Yukon has Aboriginal worldviews thoroughly 
integrated at many points (as required by the September 1990, Education Act), 
including permitted absences from school for religious and cultural activities. 
The Northwest Territories has two separate curricula specifically to address 
questions of Aboriginal worldviews (Dene, Kede, and Inuit). Although Canad-
ian schools now pay a degree of attention to Canadian Aboriginal history, or to 
their views of environment, the epistemological foundations on which those 
views rest remain largely absent from Canadian education; Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and the territories being the main exceptions.32 
So far, I have argued that Canadian publicly funded education faces a 
difficulty, somewhat of its own making. The indoctrination debate leaves few 
parties happy about what transpires in schools. Those who would dominate that 
debate now find themselves facing representatives of a plurality of worldviews, 
some, such as Islam and Aboriginal spirituality, with epistemologies utterly 
different from the Western rationalism that they charge shapes and controls 
Canadian classrooms. 
SUGGESTED WAYS FORWARD 
What forms or models might we use to show genuine respect for these world-
views and others like them which are fundamentally incompatible with the 
worldview apparently underlying most Canadian publicly funded education? 
Given that minority worldviews will not be satisfactorily addressed by adding 
a course to the school curriculum, or merely recognizing special days, foods, 
and music, how can we honour and implement true pluralism? If we are going 
to take these fundamental differences seriously, I suggest that we take a 
four-pronged approach. This will involve considering epistemology, the assimi-
lationist appearance and effects of some public policies, other possible ways to 
structure plurality, and further exploration of some key concepts related to the 
indoctrination and pluralism discussions. 
Reexamining Epistemological Foundations 
Because we must be more cautious than we have been in the past not simply to 
dismiss minority worldviews with a wave of the hand, we would do well, first, 
to reexamine the foundations of the dominant Western epistemological 
paradigm. We must be more cautious than we have been in the past; we cannot 
simply dismiss minority worldviews with a wave of the hand. 
Marginalized groups who discover a gulf between their own epistemology 
and that dominant in Canadian public schools gain momentum almost daily 
from feminist studies in philosophy as well as from other quarters. For 
example, Lorraine Code, philosopher at York University, notes that 
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Implicit in the veneration of objectivity central to scientific practice is the 
conviction that objects of knowledge are separate from knowers and 
investigators ... that they remain separate and unchanged throughout 
investigative, information-gathering, and knowledge construction 
processes. 33 
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However, she argues that "knowledge is, inextricably, subjective and objective" 
and that "knowledge is inescapably, the product of an intermingling of 
subjective and objective elements."34 Code does not go as far as many feminists 
in subjectifying knowledge, but she does open enough space to give a Muslim 
or a Canadian Aboriginal room to breathe.35 
Richard Rorty, albeit still a confessed rationalist and liberal, has begun to 
speak of those finally untestable, at-bottom convictions by which we all live. 
He calls these our "final vocabularies" and admits to their divisive function 
within society, even suggesting that liberalism itself retains the power to 
exclude.36 Rorty is not far from Anthony Flew on at least this matter: Flew 
describes at one point the "ultimacy of science" and even calls for openness "to 
the possibility of new, and possibly upsetting discoveries of what actually is the 
case."37 Ronald Laura calls Rorty' s "final vocabularies" the "epistemologically 
primitive" starting points of science, and he speaks of "frameworks" within 
which scientific and philosophical questions and answers make sense. 38 I do not 
know whether Muslims and Aboriginal Canadians consider people like Code 
and Rorty their allies. Nor do I know how many are aware that Reformed folk 
have been offering such criticisms of epistemology for decades. However, I do 
know that they are asking some of the same questions of Western science: Why 
did one way of viewing things gain its "epistemic privilege?" and "Is this 
epistemic privilege justified?"39 In this current debate, these foundational, 
worldview questions are not only among the most formidable, but they are 
among the most important. 
Rethinking Current Policies: Appearance and Effect 
Besides asking rationalism to make space in the epistemological discussion for 
other approaches, we must review the appearance and effect of current 
educational policies toward minorities, especially those whose religious 
sensibilities are offended by what appears to them an assimilationist approach. 
Minority groups are now charging that indoctrination in an alien way of 
thinking takes place in ostensibly public schools. Members of these groups 
perceive an essentially religious character in publicly funded Canadian schools 
and they feel like they have encountered the teeth of a policy of eradication and 
assimilation. These encounters, ironically, occur surrounded by the language of 
pluralism, neutrality, and toleration-even celebration-of difference. 
The defendants in the Mozert court case in the United States argued 
successfully through two courts that public schools essentially serve 
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assimilationist ends, in conflict with the Christian religion. 40 While such a case 
has no legal bearing on Canadian education, it may have moral suasion 
inasmuch as this same kind of "subtle coercion" -read: indoctrination-may 
also characterize Canadian education.41 
Pressure to reconsider whether publicly funded school classrooms are as 
neutral as their defenders claim comes from many quarters, not only from 
cultural and religious minorities or legal scholars. Some educational theorists 
as well are saying as much. For over two decades sociologists of education 
have argued that school classrooms further a conservative agenda. 
Simultaneously, voices on the right charge that classrooms promote a liberal 
agenda. 
Reconsidering Alternative Structures for Plurality 
Thus far, I have suggested that we not only scrutinize the epistemological 
discussion, but that we reexamine educational policies related to worldviews, 
to religion and to religious education. Third, I suggest that we seek ways to 
structure plurality other than the effectively assimilationist approach that, some 
people charge, presently characterizes Canadian education (even while most 
defenders of Canadian public education deny having assimilationist intentions). 
Canadians may want to attempt some kind of structural pluralism (and I mean 
pluralism in my own restricted sense here, where plurality is advocated). The 
Dutch, for example, have organized their public life in this way for most of this 
century.42 Whether in broadcasting, education, or labour unions, Dutch 
communities based on various political ideologies and religious viewpoints 
have enjoyed public space (and in the case of education-public money) to 
pursue their goods with others of like mind. 
Given how differently Dutch society is organized from our own, Canadian 
provinces should perhaps consider the model implemented in Quebec as a 
partial solution to the dissatisfaction of religious minorities. Quebec school 
boards are required to offer students as many as three choices as demand 
warrants: Roman Catholic religious education, Protestant religious education, 
or moral education. The first two are made available as opt-in courses, the last 
is required of those not desiring either of the explicitly religious options. If it 
wished, Quebec could extend the list to include, for example, Islamic religious 
education in those districts where population justified such a move. If other 
Canadian provinces adopted Quebec's approach, Canadians could provide legal 
room for minorities (and majorities) to give attention to, and expression of, their 
at-bottom religious commitments within some single publicly funded system. 
On this account, religious differences would not be ethnicized as they often are 
now-reduced to a song-and-dance routine for celebration days-but would be 
treated seriously in curriculum by people whose commitment was considered 
an asset rather than a liability. In making this suggestion, I assume that all 
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religious groups with the inclination and resources to do so should be given 
public space and money to describe their outlook on the world. 
From the point of view of some religious folk, of course, this option still 
suffers from one telling limitation: religion is still cordoned off in a single 
course, perhaps while secular materialism continues to saturate the remainder 
of the curriculum and the school ethos. Still, allowing representatives to make 
such courses available seems like the least that school boards should do if they 
indeed want to take worldview differences seriously. 
These are only two means by which to express genuine pluralism within 
education, and even they come up wanting in obvious ways. There may be 
more, and I suggest that we must think creatively to articulate what they might 
be. All the creative thinking on earth, however, will be of no use, unless those 
who claim to be the guardians of the public square admit that all education will 
be informed by one set of convictions or another, and that a society concerned 
with fairness will see to it that parents' convictions inform their own children's 
education. 43 
Reopening Key Concepts 
My last suggestion involves some of our key concepts. Even a cursory look at 
the matters I have raised here shows that we must reexamine some of the key 
ideas in the indoctrination and pluralism discussions. 
I begin with public education. Canadians interested in education, especially 
philosophers of education, may need to begin asking a highly modified gloss on 
W. D. Hudson's question of twenty years ago, "Is Religious Education 
Possible?"; namely, "Is public education possible?"44 Throughout this chapter, 
I have used the phrase "publicly funded" to refer to the schools most people call 
public schools. Without a doubt, almost all Canadians pay for these schools, 
and in that sense, they are public. But public, by definition, has to do with that 
which we do or have in common, whether meetings and parades, or transit 
systems and arenas. We want to recognize that the meaning of public has 
changed historically, and will continue to do so, but I insist that the time has 
come again to make the concept problematic, as did John S. Mill in On Liberty 
and John Dewey in The Public and Its Problems.45 This is necessary because 
increasing numbers of Canadians are now saying they do not recognize the 
publicly funded school systems of this country as theirs; that is, they do not 
share the worldview underlying these school systems. For many, public schools 
implies neutral schools, and neutral schools do not exist.46 In what direction 
must we go, or should attempt to go to make room for those groups claiming 
that publicly funded Canadian schools are failing either to make space for their 
own, openly religious, at-bottom ontological and epistemological convictions, 
or to recognize and admit the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
lying at the bottom of public education itself? 
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Refusal to reopen this question of how truly "public" Canadian publicly 
funded education actually is may indicate that defenders of publicly funded 
education have something to hide, albeit unconsciously. Such a refusal will 
serve only to increase the suspicions of those who already believe a monopoly 
exists and is primarily interested in protecting itself. Such a refusal may also 
demonstrate a shallowness of actual sentiment behind the rhetoric of pluralism 
so characteristic of Canadian educational discourse. 
Included in this call to problematize the term "public" is the 
reconsideration of our definitions of "religion" as we use it with reference to 
education.47 Ninian Smart has suggested that religious education courses (in the 
United Kingdom) consider a wide variety of ideologies when such courses treat 
world religions. Thus Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam, Buddhism and 
Christianity would be joined by humanism, secularism, communism and 
whatever other "final vocabularies" or symbolic systems people ultimately 
employ to organize their cognitive framework. In addition to this change, Smart 
suggests we use the word worldviews (as I have largely done here) instead of 
religions.48 Smart's suggestion would accord well with one line of opinion 
regarding US legal debates on separation of church and state, establishment, and 
free exercise. That line of opinion is that "any set of beliefs concerning a 
desirable way of life" functions as a religion and should be counted as such.49 
Recognizably, Smart's suggestion leads us miles away from any of the received 
definitions within philosophy of education, but it does lead us toward the 
creation of space for all Canadians to express their deepest convictions within 
the schools they are compelled to fund. 50 
Educational theorists also need to clarify several terms that arise in 
discussions of indoctrination. I include here especially neutrality and 
impartiality, the former because it has figured so centrally in American 
religion-in-education jurisprudence for over forty years and is now creeping into 
Canadian educational discourse, and the latter because I view it as the needed 
disposition among those persons committed to some worldview or other who 
inevitably will teach religion in Canadian public school classrooms. Those who 
call for neutrality in education seem to have confused something ideological or 
confessional, which does not exist, with something procedural and pedagogical. 
These people seek the former-ideologically neutral teachers-when they 
should be seeking the latter-those teachers capable of impartiality or some 
kind of procedural neutrality. That this search may necessarily be fruitless is 
discussed thoroughly in legal and educational literature.51 Perhaps what drives 
such a search is a confusion of neutrality in public space, and secularism, which 
often comes cloaked as neutrality.52 
John Valauri, in his survey of how neutrality has functioned in American 
establishment clause jurisprudence, notes three features of neutrality that I want 
to repeat here.53 First, he notes that neutrality is a complex concept, implying 
both non-involvement and impartiality. For Valauri, non-involvement does not 
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mean disinterestedness or isolation, rather it implies intentionally refraining 
from intervention which would reveal favouritism for one of the parties. 
Witness the referee in sports, who we expect to be intensely involved, yet 
remains impartial, by which Valauri means that one should examine and 
regulate one's actions to avoid giving advantage to any side. 
Valauri also notes that neutrality is a formal concept, by which he means 
that "neutral" asserts a relationship between specified things or people. We 
would need specific information about each case to determine what one is 
neutral toward. Thus, we are never able to claim that we are absolutely neutral 
or neutral toward everything (unless "we" is ontologically challenged perhaps). 
Third, Valauri notes that neutrality is an ambiguous term, having different 
meanings in different contexts, especially as it has been interpreted in the US 
Supreme Court, and in prescriptions for educational practice. This ambiguity 
may be partly related to the fact that the concept of neutrality is subject to 
conception building. By that I mean that a dictionary will report several 
meanings for neutral or neutrality, but as is the case with many central concepts 
in educational or social policy discussions, in actual use people begin to shape 
the concept according to their definitions of the good life and their visions for 
society.54 I am not saying there is anything wrong when such concep-
tion-building occurs, in fact it is in some ways the lifeblood of policy-making 
in a democratic society, I just want us to be conscious of what we are about 
when we do it. That people will argue for their conceptions of neutrality in this 
way should catch none of us off guard. But, back to Valauri's point about the 
ambiguity of neutrality. Given that the concept has become so important within 
educational policy discussion and is thus subject to conception-building, should 
we not expect such ambiguity?55 
We now ask the historical question about neutrality. Historically, have 
people thought schools or teachers should be neutral? The answer of course is, 
"for the most part, no," although we recognize that philosophers have struggled 
for centuries with questions of authority and neutrality in education. In fact, 
almost until the present century, the stated purpose of schools and the effect 
desired by both parents and teachers has always been to inculcate in the young 
specific knowledge, skills and, to our point here, values (and sometimes even 
"wisdom"!). And this pertains to duty, loyalty to king, and honour, democratic 
citizenship, good character, and the love of God, or any of several dozen other 
values or sets of values (depending on what century and state one examines). 
Neither was there any doubt historically whether school knowledge should be 
presented in such a way that the values in view were promoted. 
Having reviewed educational history in one paragraph and concluded that 
neutrality has for the most part not been considered desirable, we should now 
ask if it has ever before this century been thought possible? Again, we boldly 
answer, "no." However, we must remember that because it was not considered 
a viable notion, it was not analyzed as such. The first religion-in-education 
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cases began to reach US courts only in the 1880s. Now, ironically enough, a 
century later, many people outside the courts and the academy are becoming 
interested in the role of religion, and ideology in education. In fact groups from 
both ends of the political spectrum now say, for a variety of reasons, that 
schools are not neutral. Libertarians, children's rights advocates, some free-
schoolers, and some home-schoolers raise complaints, especially about the 
effects on children of compulsory schooling and of the curriculum in place. 
Critical theorists and feminists observe that schools treat knowledge as if it 
were actually structured the way schools structure it, instead of recognizing its 
contingent character. In other words, all knowledge is constructed by certain 
people or classes of people at certain times, with certain class or gender 
interests in view. They argue that the received view of knowledge, in fact, 
perpetuates these class and gender inequalities. In short, the curriculum itself 
is not neutral; rather it represents a selection from among many possible 
contents. 
This absence of neutrality in schools also concerns members of many 
acknowledged religions, who can cite a litany of complaints. They point to the 
relativisation of religious belief, indoctrination by silence about the role of 
religion in life, open hostility to religious belief, perceived opposition between 
the school curriculum and their own religiously informed views of geological 
origins, species development, authority, women, war, morality, sexual 
orientation, contraception, sex before marriage, self-authentication, the basis of 
self-esteem, and human perfectibility, to name only the main flashpoints. 
Representatives of business interests complain that students are poorly 
prepared for participation in the marketplace. The missing skills themselves are 
not an issue of neutrality, but the dispositions toward work with which students 
graduate, and the failure of schools to instill skills may indeed find their roots 
in the same intellectual ethos. 56 
Finally, Christians in the Reformational tradition, Canadian Aboriginals, 
Sikhs, Muslims and many others believe that all of life is rooted in underlying, 
religious convictions, that it is lived in adherence to one worldview or another. 
Such persons also struggle with what they see as the non-neutrality of 
classrooms. 
Within earshot of this chorus of voices, I find problematic the 
commonplace Canadian notion that schoolteachers should or could be neutral 
in matters of religion, or that such neutrality should or could be manifested by 
ignoring religion. Examining three non-educational situations where neutrality 
is used will make that problem clearer. 
In a most straightforward use, we speak of a car transmission being in 
neutral, that is, not in gear. With the transmission in this state, the car may 
stand still, roll forward, or roll backward, but, by definition, cannot do so either 
aided or hindered by the car's engine. If the car transmission is an example of 
neutrality, then those who expect teachers to demonstrate neutrality regarding 
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religion and other controversial issues must either be looking for some other 
kind of neutrality, or be setting themselves up for disappointment; teachers in 
classrooms are simply not capable of this kind of neutrality because the 
"engine" of one's mind is always in gear. I contend that demanding or seeking 
such neutrality gets us nowhere. 
Moreover, we remember that during the Second World War, Switzerland 
adopted a policy of neutrality, which does not mean it had no concerns, wishes, 
or preferences. Rather, it did not actively side with either the Axis or Allies.57 
The car example digests much more easily than does the Swiss example, 
perhaps for this very reason. In the sphere of action, Switzerland's neutrality 
may be akin to that of the car transmission. But we recognize that what the 
Swiss felt and what they did are two separate matters. In doing so, we gain 
another glimpse why classroom neutrality is so difficult to achieve. 
Furthermore, if we consider the referee in sports for a moment, we realize 
that any attempt the referee might make to act neutrally toward the two teams 
is bound to fail. A tight game, for example, a game played close to the rules, 
will inevitably favour one team over another. Allowing the game to open 
up-interpreting and enforcing the rules loosely-will favour the other team. 
So what is a referee to do? Those concerned for justice might call for just that, 
officiating executed in such a way that justice is done, though this stance 
obviously leaves great latitude and responsibility with the official as to what 
that means and how it is to be dispensed. This stance also implies non-
neutrality-likely in more than one direction-at various points during the 
game. Recognizing the difficulties with neutrality in these circumstances leads 
us closer to the problem with classrooms. In sports officiating, we most likely 
define the neutrality we seek in terms of impartiality toward the two teams. 
Indeed, those who are calling for neutrality in the classroom are seeking this 
kind of neutrality.58 
Obviously, in confessional schools, no one wants neutral teachers.59 But 
for publicly funded schools, and multi-faith schools, the question remains: Is 
there any way to move forward in our thinking about classroom neutrality and 
to respond to the rather naive call for neutral teachers? I suggest that classroom 
neutrality on controversial issues such as religion is more akin to neutrality in 
sports officiating than it is to that which car transmissions achieve regularly. 
It is likely only the Martian teacher who is truly neutral on matters of 
controversy such as politics and religion. Faced with the current shortage of 
Martian teachers, we need to ask who can best handle education about religion 
in classrooms. Logically, we are faced with few choices when we look for 
teachers: 
1. Experts who are usually either: 
a. insiders to religion and thus, by definition, persons who believe one 
religion to be true60 or superior, or 
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b. outsiders to religion who believe that religion is merely an 
anthropological phenomenon and not true. 
2. Non-experts, with varying degrees of religious commitment, who fit 
roughly the two categories of expertise listed just above. 
Obviously, we could fit our four classes onto a matrix, a presentation that 
would miss much of the nuancing necessary to discuss accurately the kinds and 
shades of belief we are attempting to discuss here. More accurately, we could 
perhaps talk about degrees of commitment and degrees of expertise by means 
of intersecting vertical and horizontal continua. Assuming that we expect 
teachers to be relative experts in the fields they teach (and thus have barred 
members of the second group I mentioned-non-experts-from teaching about 
religion), we can ask this question: Which kind of person is best qualified to 
teach about religion in a Canadian classroom? 
In its recommendations, the 1994 Ontario document Guidelines for Educa-
tion about Religion makes clear that religious believers are disqualified in 
principle because they are likely to indoctrinate.61 In one stroke, these 
guidelines (which are typical) eliminate one of the two groups of experts from 
which one might pick teachers for courses dealing with religion. Such a 
recommendation rests on a misunderstanding of neutrality (one suspects among 
other things). Ontario Ministry of Education seems to work under the 
impression that ideologically/confessionally neutral teachers are out there 
somewhere, though they are obviously not adherents to acknowledged religions. 
I respond that not one of us is ideologically and confessionally neutral, that all 
persons carry within themselves and live by fundamental convictions about 
religion-I would even call them religious convictions-of one kind or 
another. If we all in fact do live by such at-bottom convictions, then we must 
ask what will be the "angle" or "cant" on acknowledged religion in Ontario 
publicly funded classrooms? If the teachers in those classrooms meet Ontario's 
preferences and are therefore not adherents to any acknowledged religious faith, 
we can expect that angle to be one of comparative religion, with its built-in 
antipathy for religious conviction. Once again, followers of acknowledged 
religions are given cause for complaint. 
We could go at this problem of teaching about religion in publicly funded 
schools another way. Some people are dispositionally capable of impartially 
handling controversial matters in a classroom. It is these teachers, who have 
demonstrated that they are disposed toward and capable of such impartiality that 
ought to teach about religion in publicly funded classrooms. In other words, the 
grounds for selecting appropriate teachers are dispositional and not ideological. 
These grounds are related almost to skill.62 Unfortunately, mention of the 
disposition toward impartiality (or the ability to teach with impartiality) is 
absent from Ontario's guidelines (as is usually the case in such documents and 
discussions of teaching religion or about religion). Instead, several university 
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religious studies programs are recommended to prospective teachers of religion. 
Apparently, the twin assumptions (of Ontario's Ministry of Education) are that 
such programs provide the knowledge and dispositions necessary for proper 
instruction (or perhaps that dispositions are not an issue when one has studied 
comparative religion), and that what we might call "insider" education (at the 
Buddhist Study Centre, The Institute for Christian Studies, or The Islamic 
Society of North America, for example) is ill preparation for teaching in 
publicly funded schools. 
CONCLUSION 
When we proceed with commitment, we must recognize that the tolerance 
required in the public square should not imply indifference to real differences 
in the classroom.63 Rather, teachers and students should be able to be clear 
about and, within certain limits, live according to their differences, even argue 
about those differences, albeit with civility.64 In selecting teachers for religious 
education or for education about religion, we must recognize that all people 
possess faith commitments about religion (which I earlier called religious 
commitments).65 As Niblett said more than three decades ago, "The teacher of 
religious knowledge who does not understand what religion is really about can 
no more teach the subject than a teacher of art little moved by beauty can in any 
real sense of the term teach art."66 
If academics refuse to budge on their claim to privileged epistemic access, 
and refuse to make such terms as public, neutrality, and religion problematic, 
then those groups who sense their active and continued marginalization will 
grow increasingly impatient with the process, and with publicly funded 
education. Parties on all sides must show willingness to engage in dialogue. 
Neuhaus dismisses as impossible the notion of a naked public square, and asks 
instead for a hospitable public square in which all are welcomed to participate.67 
Recognizing that Canada is characterized by plurality, recognizing that 
annihilation and assimilation are unjust (and unworkable anyway), and 
recognizing that talking tolerance grants too little in some cases and too much 
in others, we must begin making space in Canadian schools or at least with 
Canadian educational dollars for the genuine expression of genuine differences. 
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